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  Abstract 
This paper studies profit-maximizing seller behavior when brand image affects consumer 
demand. We consider a seller facing a population of consumers with heterogeneous tastes 
regarding product quality and brand image. First, we analyze “active branding” by the seller 
through costly advertising. Our analysis shows that advertising, price and profits are all 
increasing in the average valuation of brand image in the population. Second, we examine the 
role of “passive branding” emanating from the population’s consumption of the product. We 
demonstrate that seller profits increase in the average degree of conformity in the opulation 
whereas the price remains unaffected. 
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 1 Introduction
Selling products means catering to the tastes of consumers. From a seller’s
point of view, catering to consumer tastes is complicated by the fact that tastes
are heterogeneous and not necessarily restricted to the tangible characteristics
of a given product. It is well known, for instance, that a consumer’s decision
whether to purchase a product may be inﬂuenced by his perception of the
brand image associated with the product.
Consumers are especially susceptible to brand image when consumption
is public and subject to social assessment. Consider, for example, the decision
to purchase a new car. In addition to evaluating its tangible characteristics
(horsepower, fuel efﬁciency, etc.), a consumer is likely to account for the brand
image that is associated with the car (cf. Meenaghan 1995). Similarly, a con-
sumer’s decision whether to buy an MP3 player is likely do depend on the
tangible characteristics (e.g., memory, display size) as well as the brand image
of the player. In light of the important role that brand image plays in many
markets, it is surprising that, to the best of our knowledge, there is no formal
analysis of proﬁt-maximizing seller behavior when brand image matters for
consumers.
The purpose of this paper is to study proﬁt-maximizing seller behavior
when consumer demand is affected by brand image. We analyze the behav-
ior of a seller facing a population of consumers with heterogeneous tastes re-
garding tangible product quality and brand image. Consumers either derive
brand image from the seller’s costly advertising (“active branding”) or the
population’s consumption of the product (“passive branding”).1 Our analy-
sis assumes that consumer tastes regarding product quality and brand image
are distributed according to a bivariate uniform distribution which is common
knowledge. Individual tastes, however, are private information. Importantly,
this speciﬁcation implies that different consumers have different valuations of
product quality and brand image.
In a ﬁrst step, we characterize consumer demand as a function of product
priceandbrandimage. Weshow that, dependingon theparameters ofthetype
distribution, four different cases need to be distinguished. The differences be-
tween these cases relate to the importance that the perceived brand image may
have relative to the valuation of product quality. Our analysis focuses on the
case where the perception of brand image does not “dominate” the valuation
of product quality.2
1The literature on branding commonly assumes that brand image is built on the product
itself. See, for instance, Keller and Lehmann (2006).
2This case is closest to the standard monopoly model of vertical differentiation (see below).
2Inasecond step, we employour demandframework to study optimal seller
behavior. We ﬁrst investigate active branding by the seller through costly ad-
vertising. To do so, we impose some more structure on the model. For sim-
plicity, weadopt a reduced-form approach andassume that the ﬁrm’s advertis-
ing intensity determines brand image.3 We also assume that the average con-
sumer’s valuation of brand image is positive (even though some consumers
may dislike it) to make active branding proﬁtable. For this setting, we ﬁnd
that advertising, price and proﬁts are all increasing in the average consumer’s
valuation of brand image.
Next, we examine the role of passive branding emanating from the popu-
lation’s consumption of the product. In this alternative setting, brand image
stems from consumption externalities rather than costly advertising. We as-
sume that brand image is determined by the number of consumers who pur-
chase the product and impose rational expectations on behalf of consumers
without explicitly modeling the process of forming expectations (Katz and
Shapiro 1985). A consumer has a concern for conformity (exclusivity, respec-
tively) if he is better off the higher (lower) the number buyers (see, for in-
stance, Amaldoss and Jain 2005a, b). We ﬁnd that demand and seller proﬁts
are increasing in the average degree of conformity, whereas pricing remains
unaffected.
Thispaperisrelatedto theadvertising literature surveyed inBagwell(2007).
First, our analysis suggests that, on average, active branding works similarly
to persuasive advertising which affects consumer preferences by increasing
the willingness to pay (cf. von der Fehr and Stevik 1998). The key difference is
that, in our framework, active branding may actually decrease the willingness
to pay for a subset of consumers (those with a distaste for the brand image).
Second, our analysis of passive branding is related to the literature on conspic-
uous consumption. Amaldoss and Jain (2005a) also employ a monopoly model
and examine how purchase decisions are affected by the desire for exclusivity
andconformity, respectively. Yet, these authors do not allow for heterogeneous
tastes regarding quality. Bernheim (1994), Pesendorfer (1995), Bagwell and
Bernheim (1996), Corneo and Jeanne (1997), and Kr¨ ahmer (2006) provide sig-
naling models of conspicuous consumption. Our approach is different in that
we model conformity and exclusivity using consumption externalities. Third,
our paper adds to the literature on vertical differentiation (see, e.g., Mussa and
Rosen 1978, Gabszewicz and Thisse 1979, Shaked and Sutton 1982, Baake and
Boom 2001). The standard monopoly model of vertical differentation is a spe-
cial case of our model in which brand image does not matter.
3For instance, Kr¨ ahmer (2006) shows that (persuasive) advertising creates a brand’s image
employing a signaling model.
3The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 details the analytical framework
and introduces consumer preferences that account for brand image. Section 3
derives consumer demand as a function of the product price and brand image.
Using this demand framework, Section 4 studies, respectively, active branding
and passive branding as mechanisms for building brand image and character-
izes optimal ﬁrm behavior. Section 5 discusses conclusions and directions for
future research.
2 Model
We model the provision of a branded product by a proﬁt-maximizing seller.
The production of the good may involve a ﬁxed cost F ≥ 0, and the marginal
costs of output are assumed to be constant and normalized to zero.4 The seller
faces apopulation of potential consumers with mass N, where N is normalized
to unity without loss of generality, and offers its product at price p.
The consumers’ complete experience of the product depends on both in-
trinsic product quality and “brand intangibles” (Keller and Lehmann, 2006).
Intrinsic product quality is described by the real-valued index v that summa-
rizes the various aspects of quality (Lancaster, 1966). Brand intangibles b in
contrast reﬂect image attributes such as either accompanying advertising (“ac-
tive branding”) or the consumption of the product by others (“passive brand-
ing”). We assume that consumers’ valuations θ of product quality v are uni-
formly distributed on the interval [0,1]. We also assume that consumers differ
in their perception of brand image b, captured by a taste parameter σ that fol-
lows a uniform distribution on [σ,σ], with σ < 0 and σ>0. The expectation of
σ is denoted by μσ ≡ (σ + σ)/2.
Speciﬁcally, we let a consumer’s conditional indirect utility from buying
the product be given by
V (p,y;v,b,θ,σ)=θv + σb+ y − p,
where y denotes income and y−p has the interpretation of utility derived from
consuming an outside (composite) good. Importantly, the utility difference be-
tween consuming the good and not consuming the good, V (p,y;v,b,θ,σ) − y,
dependson brand image. That is, consumers derive more utility from consum-
ing the good when they value the product’s brand image (σ>0) and less when
they dislike thebrand image (σ<0). Thetaste parametersθ andσ are indepen-
dently drawn from their respective underlying distributions. This assumption
4We assume that the ﬁxed cost do not exceed the ﬁrm’s proﬁt. Hence, they do not change
the analysis and can therefore be omitted.
4means that the valuations of quality and brand image are uncorrelated.5 We
further assume that the distributions of θ and σ are common knowledge. The
realization of type t ≡ (θ,σ), however, is private information.
3 Consumer Demand
This section derives consumer demand for the product as a function of the
price p and brand image b. Our assumptions on the distributions of θ and




(σ − σ)−1 if (θ,σ) ∈ T
0 otherwise
on the rectangular type space T ≡ [0,1] × [σ,σ].
Clearly, a consumer does not purchase the product if he attains a lower
utility than when choosing the outside good. Put differently, a consumer does
not purchase if the consumption utility, θv + σb, is less than (or equal to) the
price p. Letting F(p | b) denote the distribution function of θv + σb for given b,
the mass (or fraction) of consumers who do not purchase can be expressed as












where 1A is the indicator function of the set A. The demand for the product is
thus given by








Note that, by the deﬁnition of a distribution function, there is a monotone re-
lationship between the price p and the probability of buying, Pr{θv + σb ≥ p},
which in turn implies a downward-sloping demand curve.
Consumer demand as well as the set of buying consumers,
B ≡{ (θ,σ) | θv + σb ≥ p},
5Alternatively, one could argue either that those with high valuations of quality tend to
highly value brand image (positive correlation) or that those with the highest perceptions of
brand image are least concerned about product quality (negative correlation). Similarly, those



































Figure 1: Four type distributions.
crucially depends on the distribution of brand perceptions σ. Clearly, for ex-
tremely low prices (p ≤ σb) all consumers purchase (D(p,b)=1 ), whereas for
extremely high prices (p ≥ v + σb), no consumer purchases (D(p,b)=0 ). For
intermediate prices p ∈ (σb,v + σb), a consumer is indifferent between buying





Depending on the parameters of the distribution of brand perceptions, σ and
σ, four different cases emerge (see Figure 1 and Table 1, respectively).
If φ(0) > σ and φ(1) ≤ σ (Case 1), for instance, none of the consumers with
6Low-WTP Consumers High-WTP Consumers
(θ =0 ) ( θ =1 )
Case 1 None Buy All Buy
φ(0) > σ and φ(1) ≤ σ p>σb p ≤ v + σb
Case 2 Some Buy All Buy
φ(0) ≤ σ and φ(1) ≤ σ p ≤ σb p ≤ v + σb
Case 3 None Buy Some Buy
φ(0) > σ and φ(1) >σ p>σb p > v + σb
Case 4 Some Buy Some Buy
φ(0) ≤ σ and φ(1) >σ p ≤ σb p > v + σb
Table 1: Willingness to pay (WTP) and demands for prices p ∈ (σb,v + σb).
the lowest willingness to pay (WTP) for quality (θ =0 ) purchases the product,
whereas all consumers with the highest willingness to pay (θ =1 ) buy. Panel A
in Figure 1 illustrates the type space T along with the indifference curve and
the corresponding set of buyers B. If instead φ(0) ≤ σ and φ(1) ≤ σ (Case 2),
some consumers with the lowest willingness to pay for quality purchase the
product (those with the highest σ’s), and all consumers with the highest will-
ingness to pay buy (Panel B in Figure 1). The other two cases emerge if some
consumers with the highest willingness to pay for quality buy (p>v+σb), and
either none (p>σb, Case 3) or some (p ≤ σb, Case 4) of the consumers with the
lowest willingness to pay purchase the product (Panels C and D, respectively,
in Figure 1).
Our analysis of active and passive branding below will be based on the
demand function emerging in Case 1. This choice is motivated by our view
that it is natural to start from a setting where the valuation of intrinsic product
quality is not “dominated” by the perception of brand image. That is, we ef-
fectively impose that (i) no consumer buys solely because of the brand image,
and (ii) a distaste for the brand image does not discourage consumers with
the highest valuation of quality from buying. Clearly, brand image neverthe-
less affects the purchase decision of many consumers in the population (see
Figure 1). Lemma 1 gives the relevant demand function.








7Proof. See the Appendix.6
Three remarks on Lemma 1 are in order. First, consumer demand depends
on brand image only through μσ (and v). That is, from the ﬁrm’s point of
view, all that matters is the average consumer’s valuation of brand image. This
immediately implies that brand image is not relevant for proﬁt-maximizing
seller behavior if the distribution of consumer tastes regarding brand image
is symmetric around zero. Second, if the average consumer positively values
brand image (μσ > 0) branding has a demand-enhancing effect. Conversely,
branding has a demand-reducing effect if the average consumer dislikes the
brand image (μσ < 0). Third, observe that a higher intrinsic product quality v
increases demand, whereas a higher price p leads to lower demand.
4 Seller Behavior
In this section we study two mechanisms for building brand image. Depend-
ing on the notion of brand image, the ﬁrm may either advertise to stimulate the
demand for its product (“active branding”) or price its product by taking into
account that consumers care about the use of the product by other consumers
(“passive branding”). The benchmark model to which we shall sometimes
compare our results is the monopoly model of vertical (quality) differentiation
without brand image.
4.1 Active Branding
We ﬁrst consider active branding by the ﬁrm through costly advertising. We
describe the setup of the model and then characterize proﬁt-maximizing seller
behavior. Our main focus will be on investigating how tastes regarding brand
image affect seller behavior.
4.1.1 Setup
Suppose that the seller chooses both the price p and the brand image b he likes
to cultivate in the market place. Although brand image is typically determined
by multiple marketing activities, we employ a reduced-form approach and
suppose that it is the advertising intensity captured by the index b>0 which
determines brand image. We assume that the investment in brand image b in-
volves quadratic advertising outlays γb2, where γ ∈ IR + is large enough for
the cost function to be sufﬁciently convex (see below). In this context, the taste
6All proofs can be found in the Appendix. The appendix also provides the demand func-
tions for the other cases and shows how they are related.
8parameter σ may be interpreted as measure for ad-sensitivity. Consumers are
ad-lovers if σ>0 and ad-avoiders if σ<0.7 We assume that μσ > 0, that is, we
restrict attention to the case where advertising has a demand-enhancing effect
(which is equivalent to assuming that the majority of consumers are ad-lovers).
4.1.2 Analysis
For convenience, we view the ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximizing problem as a two-stage
decision problem and suppose that the decision about the advertising level
precedes the pricing decision.8 Therefore, the optimal price for a given adver-














where ﬁrm proﬁts are given by revenues (recall that marginal costs of output
are zero) net of the cost of advertising. Solving the necessary and sufﬁcient










Substituting the optimal price back into the objective function, we obtain the











The solution to the necessary and sufﬁcient ﬁrst-order yields the optimal in-







Straightforward calculations then yield the seller’s price, demand, and proﬁts

















Our ﬁrst proposition summarizes how the seller’s behavior is related to the
distribution of consumer tastes regarding brand image.
7This terminology is used by various authors (see, for example, Gabszewicz et al. 2005).
8Simultaneous decisions would lead to the same results.





/2v. Under this assumption, the brand image b∗ and the
price p∗ satisfy the requirements of Lemma 1. The assumption on the cost parameter γ also
ensures an interior solution for b (which in turn implies that the optimal price, demand, and
proﬁts are strictly positive) and D∗ ≤ 1.
9Proposition 1 (Active Branding). Suppose that the average consumer’s valuation
of brand image is strictly positive (μσ > 0). Then, (i) the product price p∗, (ii) the level
of advertising b∗, and (iii) seller proﬁts π∗ are increasing in μσ.
Proposition 1 highlights that consumer tastes regarding brand image may
be an important determinant of seller behavior. If the population’s average
valuation of brand image is positive, the proﬁt-maximizing price, the level of
advertising, and proﬁts are all increasing in the average consumer’s valuation
of brand image. Intuitively, the latter result stems from demand-markup com-
plementarities which are common in markets with seller power (see Athey
and Schmutzler 2001). These complementarities imply that investing in brand
image increases both price (markup) and demand, leading to higher proﬁts.
The result also suggests that, with μσ > 0, active branding on average
works similarly to persuasive advertising (cf. von der Fehr and Stevik 1998,
Bagwell 2007), which increases the consumers’ willingness to pay. Note, how-
ever, that in our analysis, active branding actually reduces the willingness to
pay of a subset of consumers (those with a distaste for the product’s brand im-
age). Proﬁt-maximizing seller behavior does account for this by tailoring the
advertising intensity to the taste of the average consumer in the population.
At a more fundamental level, the result highlights that “consumers get
what they want”: A product with given quality will be accompanied by dif-
ferent levels of advertising if sold to populations with different average valua-
tions of brand image. In the case where the average valuation of brand image
is negative, the proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm does not incur the cost of advertising
since it only reduces proﬁts.
Finally, Proposition 1 sheds light on what is known as “brand equity” in the
marketing literature (cf. Farquahr 1989, Erdem et al. 1999). The notion of brand
equity intends to capture the extra value that a ﬁrm garners from endowing a
product with a positive brand image. Our analysis suggests that a positive
brand equity requires μσ > 0.10
We now brieﬂy discuss the comparative statics properties of changes in the
other model parameters. We ﬁrst focus on advertising costs. Increasing γ re-
duces the investment in brand image, the optimal price (notice that there is
an indirect effect only as the best-response function does not depend on γ),
demand and hence the seller’s proﬁt. Shifting attention to increases in prod-
uct quality, we ﬁnd that increasing v leads to lower investments in brand im-
age, a higher price (because the positive direct effect dominates the negative
advertising-mediated effect), lower demand (due to the higher price and the
lower investment in brand image), but still higher proﬁts.
10In our model, brand equity may formally be calculated as π(μσ) − π(0) = (μ2
σv)/[4(4γv−
μ2
σ)] > 0, which is positive for μσ > 0.
104.2 Passive Branding
In this section, we consider passive branding emanating from the population’s
consumption of the product. Again, we ﬁrst discuss the setup of the model
and then characterize the proﬁt-maximizing seller behavior. The main focus of
the analysis will be on investigating how tastes regarding the consumption of
others affects optimal seller behavior.
4.2.1 Setup
Suppose that the seller’s only decision variable is the price p and let brand im-
age be captured by the index b, which is determined by the population’s con-
sumption of the product. More speciﬁcally, we suppose that b is determined by
the expected number of consumers De(p) who purchase the product at price
p.11 That is, passive branding is driven by consumption externalities among
heterogeneous individuals. In line with the economic analysis of networks, we
impose rational expectations on behalf of consumers without explicitly mod-
eling the process of forming expectations (Katz and Shapiro 1985).
In this setting, σ reﬂects a consumer’s taste regarding the consumption of
others, that is, his “social attitude”. A consumer with a taste parameter σ>0
is called a conformist, because he is better off the higher the (expected) num-
ber of consumers who purchase the product (cf. Clark and Oswald 1998, Grilo
et al. 2001, Amaldoss and Jain 2005a, b). Conversely, a consumer with a taste
parameter σ<0 is called an exclusivist, because he is worse off the higher the
number of consumers. In the subsequent analysis, we let the expectation of σ,
μσ, represent the average degree of conformity in the population. In contrast to
our above analysis of active branding, we leave the sign of μσ unrestricted.12
We require, however, that the average degree of conformity in the popula-
tion is sufﬁciently small relative to the average valuation of product quality
(see below). This assumption is consistent with our focus on demand where
the valuation of intrinsic product quality is not dominated by the valuation of
brand image.
4.2.2 Analysis
Under the assumption of fulﬁlled expectations, consumers’ expected demand
must be equal to actual demand. Thus, expected demand De(p) must satisfy
the ﬁxed point condition De(p)=D(p;De(p)), from which we can infer the
11In principle, consumers might also be interested in the purchase decisions of particular
subgroups of the population (e.g. consumers with the highest willingness to pay for quality).
For simplicity, we abstract from this possibility.
12Note that μσ < 0 if the majority of consumers are exclusivists.





The seller’s only decision variable is the product price p. Given perceived














It is immediately apparent that the optimal price does not depend on the aver-
age degree of conformity in the population. This follows from the fact that
the only impact μσ has on perceived demand is through the scaling factor
1/(v − μσ). Consequently, the seller’s optimal price p∗ coincides with the price
in the standard monopoly model of vertical differentiation.
Substituting the optimal price back into the demand function, it is straight-
forward to calculate consumer demand and seller proﬁts in terms of the model










The next proposition summarizes our key results.
Proposition 2 (Passive Branding). Assume that consumers form rational expecta-
tions about the consumption of others and let μσ denote the average degree of confor-
mity in the population. Then, (i) the product price p∗ is independent of μσ and (ii)
consumer demand D∗ and seller proﬁts π∗ are increasing in μσ.
Proposition 2 highlights that the average degree of conformity may be an
important determinant of consumer demand and seller proﬁts even if it leaves
the proﬁt-maximizing price unaffected. It implies, in particular, that consumer
demand in a conformistic population (μσ > 0) is higher than in a exlusivistic
population (μσ < 0) even though prices are equal. This ﬁnding complements
earlier work by Grilo et al. (2001) and Amaldoss and Jain (2005a, b) who em-
phasize the impact of social concerns on product prices.
13We assume μσ <v− max{−σ,σ} so that the requirements of Lemma 1 are satisﬁed. This


































Figure 2: Demand effects of shifts in the type space T.
The result also implies that the seller of a product perceived as exclusive
does not necessarily need to “restrict” the quantity it sells, for instance, by sell-
ing through exclusive distribution channels only.14 Our analysis rather sug-
gests that, if the majority of consumers perceives the good as exclusive, con-
sumer demand will automatically be low.
As mentioned above, result (i) of Proposition 2 follows from the fact that
the average degree of conformity affects perceived demand solely through a
scaling factor and therefore leaves the proﬁt-maximizing price unaffected. The
intuition for result (ii) is best understood by inspection of Figure 2, which il-
lustrates the demand effects of an increase in the average degree of conformity
μσ from an “upwards shift” of the type space T.
Let us ﬁrst consider Panel A where the majority of consumers are con-
formists (μ 
σ > 0). Recall from Section 3 that the set of buyers B is given by
the area to the right of the negatively sloped straight line trough T represent-
ing the indifference condition σ = φ(θ). It is easy to see that the upwards shift
of T increases the average degree of conformity from μ 
σ to μ  
σ. In addition, it
14Another device of sellers of exclusive goods is to restrict trade by not selling over the In-
ternet or by marketing “limited editions”. See Amaldoss and Jain (2005a,b) and the references
therein.
13adds consumers with a strong taste for conformity (σ>σ )t oB and excludes
consumers with a strong taste for exclusivity (σ<σ   )f r o mB. Interestingly,
the upwards shift in T also leads to a counter-clockwise rotation of the indif-
ference condition σ = φ(θ) around the point of intersection with the θ-axis.15
That is, consumers in the neighborhood of the original indifference condition
reverse their purchase decision in response to the upwards shift in T. Intu-
itively, this follows from the rational expectation of higher demand, such that
conformists (exclusivists, respectively) derive a higher (lower) indirect utility
from consumption. Note that the overall demand effect of the increase from
μ 
σ to μ  
σ is positive, as stated in part (ii) of Proposition 2.
Next, consider Panel B where the majority of consumers are exclusivists
(μ 
σ < 0). Again, the upward shift of T increases the average degree of confor-
mity from μ 
σ to μ  
σ. This adds new consumers with σ>σ  to B and excludes
consumers with σ>σ    from B. In addition, consumers rationally expect
higher demand and revise their purchase decisions accordingly. The overall
demand effect of the increase from μ 
σ to μ  
σ is again positive.
Before concluding, we brieﬂy discuss how changes in intrinsic product
quality v affect optimal quantities. Clearly, increasing v calls for a higher opti-
mal price p∗. Interestingly, demand at the optimal price p∗ is decreasing in v,
although quality has a demand-enhancing effect. That is, the negative price-
mediated effect dominates the positive direct demand effect of increasing v.
As a result, seller proﬁts are increasing in v.
5 Conclusions
This paper has studied proﬁt-maximizing seller behavior when brand image
affects consumer demand. Considering a monopoly seller facing consumers
with heterogeneous tastes regarding product quality and brand image, we
have characterized consumer demand and analyzed active branding by the
seller through costly advertising and passive branding emanating from the
population’s consumption of the product.
We have shown that the distribution of tastes in the population is an impor-
tant determinant of seller behavior: With active branding, advertising, price,
and proﬁts are all increasing in the average valuation of brand image in the
population. With passive branding, seller proﬁts are increasing in the average
degree of conformity in the population, even though the price remains unaf-
fected.
15To see this, note that an increase in μσ increases D(p) and thus De(p) (by fulﬁlled expec-
tations). Since De(p)=b with passive branding, the denominator in the slope φ  = −v/b
becomes larger, leading to a counter-clockwise rotation of the indifference curve.
14Our analysis suggests a number of avenues for future research. First, it
would be interesting to study the behavior of a seller that offers several ver-
sions of the product with different brand images. Second, it would be natural
to extend the analysis to a setting with imperfect competition where brand im-
age matters. In such a setting, it is conceivable, for instance, that sellers com-
pete in positioning their products in the quality/brand image space. Third,
it would be interesting to examine settings where the sellers may be able to
inﬂuence the consumers’ perception of brand image (which is exogenous in
our setting by assumption). Fourth, and ﬁnally, our framework for deriv-
ing demand may be generalized to other types of distributions and higher-
dimensional tastes. We hope to address these issues in future research.
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16Appendix
This appendix gives the proofs of our results.
A.1 Consumer Demand
This section derives the demand function for each of the four cases for all prices p ∈
(σb,v + σb). In what follows, the subscript i indexes cases. We begin with Case 1.








Proof. Deﬁne ˆ θ1 and ˜ θ1 as the points satisfying φ(ˆ θ1)=σ and φ(˜ θ1)=σ, respectively,
and recall that each point in B ⊂ T has density (σ − σ)
−1. Using Figure 1 (Panel A),




ˆ θ1 (σ − σ)+












and ˜ θ1 =
p − bσ
v
into the preceding equation, we ﬁnd
Pr{θv + σb ≤ p} =
2p − b(σ + σ)
2v
.








Next, we consider Case 2.




2v (σ − σ)b
.
Proof. Deﬁne ˜ θ2 as the point satisfying φ(˜ θ2)=σ. Using Panel B in Figure 1, con-
sumers do not purchase with probability





2v (σ − σ)b
.




2v (σ − σ)b
.
17Next, we consider Case 3.
Case 3. For p>v+ σb and p>σb, the ﬁrm’s demand is
D3(p,b)=
(v − p + σb)
2
2v (σ − σ)b
.
Proof. Deﬁne ˆ θ3 as the point satisfying φ(ˆ θ3)=σ. Using Panel C in Figure 1, con-








[σ − φ(1)] =
(v − p + σb)
2
2v (σ − σ)b
.
Thus, demand is given by
D3(p,b)=
(v − p + σb)
2
2v (σ − σ)b
> 0.
Finally, we consider Case 4.
Case 4. For p>v+ σb and p ≤ σb, the ﬁrm’s demand is
D4(p,b)=
v − 2p +2 σb
2(σ − σ)b
.










v − 2p +2 σb
2(σ − σ)b
,
thus implying that demand is given by
D4(p,b)=
v − 2p +2 σb
2(σ − σ)b
.
The next result derives the demand for prices p ∈ (σb,v + σb).
Claim 1. Fix b and suppose that p ∈ (σb,v + σb). Then, demand is a piecewise-deﬁned,





D2(p,b) if p ≤ σb
D1(p,b) if σb < p ≤ v + σb
D3(p,b) if p>v+ σb.





D2(p,b) if p ≤ v + σb
D4(p,b) if v + σb<p≤ σb
D3(p,b) if p>σb.
18Proof. Considerthecase whereσb ≤ v+σb. Demand is continuoussince thepiecewise






ˆ D1(v + σb,b)=
(σ − σ)b
2v
= ˆ D3(v + σb,b)






















Now, consider the case where σb > v + σb. Then,
˜ D2(v + σb,b)=1−
v
2(σ − σ)b



























A.2 Proof of Proposition 1

























A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of (i) is immediate as p∗ does not depend on μσ. (ii) Differentiating yields
dD∗(μσ)
dμσ
=
v
2(v − μσ)
2 > 0
and
dπ∗(μσ)
dμσ
=
v2
4(v − μσ)
2 > 0.
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